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The NBA Draft Lottery: Losing More Games Stopped Buying Better Odds

By SportsGoogly Editorial Published Updated Facts verified

TL;DR

Until 2019 the NBA's worst team had a 25% chance of the first pick, the second-worst 19.9% and the third-worst 15.6%, so every extra defeat improved the odds. The reform gave the three worst records identical 14% odds and drew four picks rather than three. Because four are drawn, the team with the worst record can fall no lower than fifth — but it can fall to fifth. Between the flattened top and the deeper draw, the reward for finishing last rather than third-last is now close to zero.

NBA draft lottery: three worst teams at 14% each, four picks drawn, worst record can pick fifth.
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The old odds paid for every defeat

Before the reform, the lottery odds ran 25% for the worst record, 19.9% for second-worst, 15.6% for third-worst, and downward from there.

That is a steep curve, and a steep curve is an instruction.

A team already out of contention in February faced a straightforward calculation: nine more points of first-pick probability were available, and the only cost was losing games it had no reason to win. The rational move was to rest its best players, play its youngest, and finish as low as possible.

Fans understood this perfectly, which is what made it corrosive. Supporters were being asked to buy tickets for a team openly trying to lose — and the league had built the incentive itself.

Flatten the top

The reform gave the three worst records identical 14% odds.

That single change removes the entire calculation between first, second and third-worst. There is now no gain whatsoever from finishing last rather than third-last, so the last six weeks of a bad team’s season carry no draft consequence at all within that band.

The rest of the curve was softened rather than flattened: 12.5% for the fourth seed, 10.5% for the fifth, 9% for the sixth, with gaps of one or two points rather than five.

Small gaps mean small incentives. A team can still improve its odds by losing, but the improvement is now roughly a percentage point — which is not worth a season of alienating an audience.

Then draw four picks instead of three

The second half of the reform is less discussed and does more work.

Four picks are drawn rather than three. Everything after that is ordered by record.

So the team with the worst record in the league can finish no lower than fifth — and, crucially, can finish fifth. Under the old three-pick draw, the floor was fourth.

That extra step matters because it introduces a real chance of the worst outcome. A franchise that deliberately lost sixty games has a substantial probability of drawing nothing and picking fifth, behind teams that were better than it all year.

Flattened odds remove the reward for tanking. The deeper draw adds a visible risk. Together they make the strategy not merely less profitable but occasionally humiliating.

Why the NBA needs this and other leagues do not

Tanking is a structural feature of leagues with three properties: a closed membership, a reverse- order draft, and a sport where one player can transform a franchise.

Basketball has all three in the extreme. Five players on the floor means a single superstar changes a team’s ceiling more than in any other major sport, so the top pick is worth far more than it is elsewhere.

Leagues with promotion and relegation do not have this problem, because the bottom of the table is dangerous rather than rewarding. A European football club cannot tank; it would be relegated.

The NBA cannot relegate anybody, so it has to manufacture the same discipline artificially — with flattened odds, a deeper draw, and the play-in tournament making tenth place worth having.

Read together, those two reforms attack the same problem from both ends: the play-in raises the floor of what is worth competing for, and the lottery lowers the ceiling of what losing can buy.

What it has not fixed

Honesty requires noting the limits.

A team fourteenth in the lottery order still has better odds than one that made the play-in, so the gradient has not disappeared — it has been made gentle. Somewhere in the standings, losing is still marginally better than winning.

And the deeper problem is untouched. A franchise with no realistic path to contention still has more to gain from a multi-year rebuild than from finishing tenth every season, and no lottery structure can change that, because the incentive comes from how basketball works rather than from the odds.

What the reform did was end the race to the bottom — the specific, visible, season-ending contest between three or four teams to be worst. That contest was the part fans could see, and it is gone.

For the game itself, see basketball rules and the shot clock’s history.

Frequently asked questions

What are the worst team's odds now?

14% — the same as the second and third-worst records.

What were they before?

25% for the worst record, 19.9% for the second-worst and 15.6% for the third-worst.

How many picks are drawn?

Four, up from three.

How far can the worst team fall?

To fifth, because four picks are drawn before the rest are ordered by record.

Why was it changed?

To reduce the incentive to lose deliberately for a better draft position.

Do the odds still favour bad teams?

Yes, but far more gently — 14% at the top down through the fourth seed at 12.5% and the fifth at 10.5%.

Sources

  1. NBA — Board of Governors approves changes to the draft lottery system
  2. NBAstuffer — draft lottery odds explained